Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences
Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP ) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not ge...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005