Group Hug: Platform Competition with User Groups
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider platform competition for small users and a user group. One enjoys quality advantage the other benefits from favorable beliefs. study whether group mitigates users’ coordination problem—i.e., joining low-quality because they believe that would do same. find can facilitate on high-quality may choose to maintain dominance of one. Users’ utility is non-monotonic in proportion Finally, we highlight factors motivate help win market. (JEL D85, L14)
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190372