Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility

The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions

Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. dispositions necessarily have d...

Weak and Global Supervenience: Functional Bark and Metaphysical Bite?

Weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience for intrinsic properties. Moreover, weak and global supervenience relations are always mere parts of a more general underlying strong supervenience relation. Most appeals to global supervenience, though, involve spatio-temporally relational properties; but here too, global and strong supervenience are equivalent. Functionally ...

"It's all too subjective": scepticism about the possibility or use of philosophical medical ethics.

In one of a series of articles on philosophical medical ethics, Gillon rebuts the argument that moral claims are essentially different from scientific claims because scientific claims are objective and confirmable or refutable, while moral claims are subjective, unconfirmable, irrefutable, and their differences incapable of resolution. He contends that there is widespread agreement about many ...

Experts, truth and scepticism

We scientists have a dilemma. We are experts in our area of research, but our job demands that we constantly remain sceptical of our latest results even when we deeply believe we have unfolded new layers of truth. This is the world of science and, for the most part, we accept its contradictions. For those on the outside, however, this creates a problem of whom to believe. When a scientist is ca...

Underdetermination and Evidence