Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence From Trust Games
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economics models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. We examine gender differences in bargaining using the ‘‘trust game’’ introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). In this two-person game, the ‘‘proposer’’ is giv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.2.386