منابع مشابه
Free entry and social inefficiency
Previous articles have noted the possibility of socially ineficient levels of entry in markets in whichJirms must incurjixed set-up costs upon entry. This article identijies thefundamental and intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. Ifan entrant causes incumbentJirms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward...
متن کاملFree Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition
We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market size or consumers’ willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient entry into the market in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on the m...
متن کاملQuantity leadership and social inefficiency
A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneously in stage 1 by paying a fixed cost, and they choose output levels sequentially in subsequent stages. At the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, the production level of a firm is decreasing with the order of the firm in the decision-making. The firm that is the last to choose output produc...
متن کاملPrivate Contracts and Social Inefficiency: Confining the Coase Theorem∗
If people are free to contract, will outcomes be efficient? We study the question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. With mandatory participation, efficiency is attaina...
متن کاملBounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games
We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games (SCGs), where each player’s individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful abstractions of altruistic games when it comes to the analysis of the robust price of anarchy. We first show that SCGs are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., the robust...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER)
سال: 2010
ISSN: 2157-8893,1542-4448
DOI: 10.19030/jber.v8i3.695