Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
FOREWORD Embracing Administrative Common Law
This Foreword begins with the descriptive claim that much of administrative law is really administrative common law: doctrines and requirements that are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual agencies. Although governing statutes exert some constraining force on judicial creativity, the primary basis of these judge-fashioned doctrines...
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The Reagan Administration’s aggressive efforts to deregulate the national economy touched off a sharp debate over the proper relationship between the White House and the federal bureaucracy—and that debate continues to this day. Peter Strauss’s foreword1 last year directly joined it by setting forth an elegant and incisive critique of the notion that the President should be empowered to act as ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2047074