Flexible and mandatory banking supervision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Stability
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1572-3089
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.12.002