Fine cartels
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper studies a simple model of repeated cartel that can punish using both voluntary fines and inefficient prices wars. The idea is to use the in response noisy signals bad behavior back it up with threats price wars easily observed failure pay fines. shown deliver insights modern game theory an empirically accurate tractable form.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2196-1085', '2196-1093']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00205-z