Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
We investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy theCondorcet Jury Theorem (CJT ). In theBayesian game Gn among n jurors, we allow for arbitrary distribution on the types of jurors. In particular, any kind of dependency is possible. If each juror i has a “constant strategy”, σ i (that is, a strategy that is independent of the size n ≥...
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We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the Nitzan-Paroush framework of “unequal competencies” and Ladha’s model of “correlated voting by the jurors”. We assume that the jurors behave “informatively”, that is, they do not make a strategic use of their information in voting. Formally, we consider a sequence of binary random variables X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn, ...) wit...
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Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1 2 . We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a ran...
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We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to voting. With two alternatives and ...
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We consider a committee, board, group or jury that faces a binary collective decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information and all members agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown and members may differ in their valuations of the two types of mistake that may occur, and/or in the prior they hold about the true stat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0546-1