منابع مشابه
Revisiting Confusion in Public Goods Experiments
Theories put forth to explain cooperation in public goods experiments usually assume either that subjects cooperate because they do not understand the game’s incentives or that cooperation stems from social motives such as altruism and reciprocity. Recent research by Andreoni (1995) is an important first attempt to distinguish the roles of confusion and social motives in these environments. How...
متن کاملPartner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and comp...
متن کاملCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the "sucker" in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that...
متن کاملConditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments.
Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in t...
متن کاملPartners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments
How can an experimenter balance the desire to test a single-shot Nash equilibrium prediction with the need for repeated experience by subjects? Simply repeating the game with the same set of subjects may change the nature of equilibrium, since incomplete information about “types” can lead to reputation effects of the sort described by Kreps et al. (1982). A common way to deal with this has been...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9670-z