Experience, Belief, and the Interpretive Fold

Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie Experience , Belief , and the Interpretive Fold

WE SEE TWO CLUSTERS of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions ...

belief function and the transferable belief model

Beliefs are the result of uncertainty. Sometimes uncertainty is because of a random process and sometimes the result of lack of information. In the past, the only solution in situations of uncertainty has been the probability theory. But the past few decades, various theories of other variables and systems are put forward for the systems with no adequate and accurate information. One of these a...

Blinded by Experience: Prior Experience, Negative News and Belief Updating

Hallucinating God? The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Religious Belief and Experience

At least since M ARX and F REUD , there has existed a conceptualization of religious belief as pathological. 1 According to this view, religious beliefs result from, and are indicative of, some kind of intellectual flaw or deficiency (P LANTINGA 2000). We might say that religious beliefs are here construed as reflecting doxastic dysfunction (from the Greek word “doxa”, meaning “opinion” or “bel...

Applying Heidegger’s interpretive phenomenology to women’s miscarriage experience

Much has been written about measuring the feelings and impressions of women regarding their experience of miscarriage. According to the existential philosopher Heidegger life experiences such as the experience of a woman having a miscarriage can be interpreted and explained only in the context of the totality of the women's experiences in the past, the present, and the future. Thirteen in-depth...