Expectations equilibrium with expectations conditioned on past data
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Learning Within Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the “true” structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents’ decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy...
متن کاملGreat expectations: Past wages and unemployment durations☆
Decomposing wages into worker and firm wage components, we find that firm-fixed components are sizeable parts of workers' wages. If workers can only imperfectly observe the extent of firm-fixed components in their wages, they might be misled about the overall wage distribution. Such misperceptions may lead to unjustified high reservation wages, resulting in overly long unemployment durations. W...
متن کاملEndogenous Dollarization, Expectations, and Equilibrium Monetary Policy∗
Emerging market countries have trouble ßoating, and many that claim to ßoat do not deliver on such promises. That is a main conclusion of much recent empirical work, starting with the papers of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Stein et al (1999). The reason for this would seem to be dollarization of liabilities and balance sheet effects. Calvo (1999 and 2000), Krugman (1999 and 2000), Stein, Hausm...
متن کاملA Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Informative Trading Volume
Grossman (1976) shows how market prices aggregate private information. In this paper I show how trading volume helps investors to interpret the aggregate information in the price. I construct a model where investors trade for two reasons: private information and risk sharing. When trading volume is high, investors know that private signals are dispersed. They therefore weight the market price h...
متن کاملRational Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery
This paper studies general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. All trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. Agents buy lists of bundles that give them the right to receive one of the bundles. With rational expectations, that is, knowledge of the selection mechanism, agents can predict which bundle will be delivered in each state of nature...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1980
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(80)90050-2