Evidence that waste aversion begets insurance aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Legal expenses insurance , risk aversion and litigation ∗
The risks involved in litigation are well documented; they include the risk of incurring legal expenses. While much literature focuses on contingent fees as a mechanism for litigants to shift this risk, there is little work on legal expenses insurance—the dominant means of shifting this risk in Europe. In our model, a risk averse plaintiff may purchase legal expenses insurance. The defendant ma...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.018