منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program imp...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium
This paper considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) within an equilibrium matching framework when wages are determined by strategic bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining approach, reducing UI payments with duration is welfare increasing. A co-ordinated policy approach, however, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, implies a much greater welfare gain than...
متن کاملPricing Unemployment Insurance in Iran
Abstract Employees always concern about losing their job, or in other word, losing their income resources. For this purpose, governments require strong protection system for covering these concerns. The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program’s can be used for achieving this goal. Based on article five of Iranian unemployment Insurance law, premium is four percent of employee’s salary while emplo...
متن کاملUnemployment Insurance
The Keele Economics Department produces this series of research papers in order to stimulate discussion and invite feedback. Copyright remains with the authors. All papers in the kerp series are available for downloading from the Keele Economics website, via Abstract This paper analyses a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insuran...
متن کاملUnemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.311585