Equilibrium contract strategies under asymmetric product substitutability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: MATEC Web of Conferences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2261-236X
DOI: 10.1051/matecconf/201710005071