منابع مشابه
Envy - Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies ∗
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9986190. We thank Andy Postlewaite for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena...
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e goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a “fair” way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the b...
متن کاملGeneralizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents
Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which ...
متن کاملPareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems
We study Pareto optimal matchings in the context of house allocation problems. We present an O( √ nm) algorithm, based on Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Method, for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching, where n is the number of agents and m is the total length of the preference lists. By contrast, we show that the problem of finding a minimum cardinality Pareto optimal matching is N...
متن کاملCounting Popular Matchings in House Allocation Problems
We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given instance. McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time algorithm for counting the number of popular matchings when the preference lists are strictly ordered. We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that the problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard when there are ties. We give an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.005