Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, base...
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Division of a resource among multiple agents is a frequent problem in multiagent systems and fair, efficient, and decentralized allocation procedures are highly valued. A division of a resource or good is envy-free when every agent believes that its share is not less than anyone else’s share by its own estimate. As envy-free procedures are not efficient (in the sense of Pareto optimality) we ha...
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There have been several interesting results in the literature on dividing up goods between self-interested parties such that the allocation is envy-free (Brams Taylor 1996). An allocation is deemed envy-free when every party (agent) believes that its share is not less than anyone else’s share. These procedures, however, are not efficient (in the sense of pareto optimality) general. Envy-free pr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1510