Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the economics of international environmental agreements
This paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction...
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We introduce uncertainty and risk aversion to the study of international environmental agreements. We consider a simple model with identical agents and linear payoffs. We show that a stable treaty with positive action always exists. While uncertainty lowers the action of signatories, we find that it may increase participation. In addition, uncertainty may generate multiple equilibria. A treaty ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01518-3