Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments

We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods and side payments are not allowed. We assume each agent can withhold some endowments, as well as misreport her preference. Under this assumption, strategyproofness requires that for each agent, reporting her true preference with revealing all her endowments is a domin...

Endowments and the Real Exchange Rate : A Comparison

Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. W...

Exclusion-Freeness in Multi-party Exchange Protocols

In this paper we define a property for multi-party protocols called exclusion-freeness. In multi-party protocols respecting the strongest definition of this property, participants are sure that they will not be excluded from a protocol’s execution and, consequently, they do not have to trust each other any more. We study this property on a wellknown multi-party fair exchange protocol with an on...

Sodium-Calcium Exchange with Anion Exclusion and Weathering Corrections

In order to accurately model soil reclamation with concentrated electrolytes such as CaCl2 or sea water, it must be determined if there is an effect of salinity on the Na-Ca exchange selectivity. A new procedure for determining Na-Ca selectivity in calcareous and gypsiferous soils was used to study the effects of ionic strength and mineralogy on Na-Ca exchange. Four specimen clay minerals and t...