Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control

Global Public Goods and Coalition Formation under Matching Mechanisms

Matching mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate underprovision of public goods in voluntary contribution models. This paper investigates coalition formation under matching mechanisms with multiple players who have the same preference but different incomes. Given income heterogeneity within a certain range, there always exist small matching rates which make all members in the coalition better...

Farsightedness in Coalition Formation

Coalition Formation in Manets

Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used as incentives to form coalitions inside the network. In this paper, we study coalition fo...

Coalition Formation

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine withingroup actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes a variety of solution concepts, using an umbrella model that adopts an explicit real-time approach. Playe...

Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria