Efficient Estimation of Equilibria in Large Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those is challenging when the number of players large. In framework atomic aggregative with coupling constraints, we show that variational Nash equilibria a large game can be approximated by Wardrop auxiliary population smaller dimension. Each this corresponds to group initial game. This approach enables efficient computation equilibrium, as inequality characterizing dimension than one. illustrated example smart grid context.
منابع مشابه
Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decrea...
متن کاملA distributed algorithm for average aggregative games with coupling constraints
We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost functions, but also via affine constraints on the average of the agents’ strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm that achieves an almost Nash equilibri...
متن کاملAggregative Games with Entry1
Aggregative games are used to model strategic interaction in many elds of economics, including industrial organization, political economy, international trade, and public nance. In such games, each players payo¤ depends on his/her own actions and an aggregate of all players actions. Examples in industrial organization are the Cournot oligopoly model, logit and CES di¤erentiated products Ber...
متن کاملEquilibria in Large Games with Strategic Complementarities∗
We study a class of static games with a continuum of players and complementarites. Using monotone operators on the space of distributions, we prove existence of the greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium under different set of assumptions than one stemming from Mas-Colell (1984) original work, via constructive methods. In addition, we provide computable monotone comparative statics ...
متن کاملEfficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games
We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study α-approximate k-equilibria of these games, i.e., outcomes where no group of at most k players can deviate such that each member increases his payoff by at least...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0018-9286', '1558-2523', '2334-3303']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2020.3008649