Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
We prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent-value, uniform-price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy. We show that the uniform-price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price. More g...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation and Large Auctions
We start with the simplest possible model. There are kn objects for sale and n potential buyers. The valuations vi are drawn independently from a common distribution F (vi) for all potential bidders. We assume that F has a continuous density function f . Suppose now that the objects are allocated according to the following rule: kn buyers with the highest bids receive the object and pay the pri...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation and Large Auctions
We start with the simplest possible model. There are kn objects for sale and n potential buyers. The valuations vi are drawn independently from a common distribution F (vi) for all potential bidders. We assume that F has a continuous density function f . Suppose now that the objects are allocated according to the following rule: kn buyers with the highest bids receive the object and pay the pri...
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In this paper we investigate the principal–multi agent relationship with moral hazard where a risk neutral principal contracts with multiple risk averse agents whose actions are unobservable to the principal. We show that the well–known trade–off between incentive and risk sharing can be asymptotically resolved as the number of agents becomes sufficiently large, when an arbitrary fraction of ag...
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We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k + 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction. We then consider a sequence of auctions Ar with nr bidders and kr objects. We show that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.3.499