Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information

Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information∗

We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the equilibria can be pooling or separating, but a particular novel refinement forces the pooling to be o...

Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities

Dynamic Bayesian Information Measures

This paper introduces measures of information for Bayesian analysis when the support of data distribution is truncated progressively. The focus is on the lifetime distributions where the support is truncated at the current age t>=0. Notions of uncertainty and information are presented and operationalized by Shannon entropy, Kullback-Leibler information, and mutual information. Dynamic updatings...

Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence

In a simple trading game the buyer and seller have repeated opportunities to acquire and disclose hard (verifiable) evidence about the value of the tradable good. The parties disclose individually favourable information but conceal signals which are beneficial to the other side. In a leading case of interest with a finite horizon and sufficiently patient players, the equilibrium is characterize...

Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion with a Privately Informed Receiver

We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion framework in a finite horizon setting consisting of a Seller and a Buyer. The Seller wishes to persuade the Buyer to buy a durable good at a given price by providing information about its relevance (match quality). The Buyer has private information about his valuation for a good match and we study optimal dynamic information policies employed by the Seller...