منابع مشابه
Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Pricing and Piggybacking under Network Effects
A repeated challenge of the two-sided market literature is the “chicken-and-egg” problem. In a single-period setting, subsidizing one side of the market to jumpstart the platform adoption process has been suggested as the solution. However, it is not known whether such subsidizing strategies remain optimal under dynamic platform competition. This paper develops a multi-period framework to study...
متن کاملDynamic Cooperation and Competition in a Network of Spiking Neurons
We discuss recurrent networks with local excitatory and surrounding inhibitory connectivity and their implications as model for the dynamics of sensory awareness and oculomotor programming. A spiking version of such a model and its association with simulations of the superior colliculus are reviewed. We also discuss the competition for attention within this model as put forward by Taylor, and p...
متن کاملDynamic Duopoly Competition with Switching Costs and Network Externalities
This paper analyzes competition in a two-period differentiated-products duopoly in the presence of both switching costs and network effects. Consumers are assumed to have rational expectation about network sizes, and future prices. The equilibrium prices in both periods are lower than markets with just switching costs and they decrease with the magnitude of network effects. Hence, in any period...
متن کاملDynamic Mergers Drive Industrial Competition Evolution: A Network Analysis Perspective
This paper presents a novel method to explore the relationship between dynamic mergers and evolution of industrial competition by introducing complex network tool. Taking the beer industry of China as an example, we establish Markets-Firms bipartite time series networks, weighted Markets-Firms time series networks and industrial competition time series networks by using the data from 1992 to 20...
متن کاملDynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters∗
This paper considers dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. We ask whether a low-quality but focal platform can maintain its focal position along time, when it ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2335716