Dynamic capital structure choice and investment timing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Investment, Capital Structure, and Debt Overhang
We model dynamic investment, financing and default decisions of a firm, which begins its life with a collection of growth options. The firm exercises them optimally over time, and finances the costs of investment by adjusting its capital structure, which trades off the tax benefits with the distress cost of debt and the agency cost of investment distortions from potential debt overhang. Conflic...
متن کاملHuman Capital Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
In this paper we analyze how an individual should optimally invest in human capital when he also has financial wealth. We treat the individual’s option to take more education as expansion options and apply real option analysis. We characterize the individual’s optimal consumption strategy and portfolio weights. The individual has a demand for hedging financial risk, labor income risk, and also ...
متن کاملTax Convexity , Investment , and Capital Structure ∗
This paper examines the interaction between investment and financing decisions of a firm using a real options approach. The firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the irreversible investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the fir...
متن کاملHuman capital investment and portfolio choice over the life-cycle∗
I study a theoretical model of life-cycle portfolio choice for an investor who has an option to invest in human capital but is liquidity constrained. I find that, since the young are more likely to exercise the option than the old, they are more concerned about liquidity risk (i.e. the risk that the liquidity constraint binds when it is optimal to invest). This, in turn, implies a hump-shaped p...
متن کاملContract Structure, Risk Sharing, and Investment Choice
Few micro nance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing micro nance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that uni es models of investment choice, informal insurance, and formal nancial contracts. I then test the predic...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.04.002