Durable-Goods Monopoly: Laboratory Market and Bargaining Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Durable–Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
This paper solves for the profit maximising strategy of a durable–goods monopolist when incoming demand varies over time. Each period, additional consumers enter the market; these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase. We first characterise the consumer’s utility maximisation problem and, under a monotonicity condition, show the profit maximising allocation can be solved throug...
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There are industries that tend to remain monopolized, with successive generations of a good being introduced by an incumbent monopolist. This paper investigates the tendency of persistent leadership in durable goods industry. In particular it explores the implications of the durability of a good on the pricing and innovation behavior of both the incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant. It ...
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متن کاملOnline Appendix – Durable Goods Monopoly with Stochastic Costs
The proof of Theorem 2 is organized as follows. First, I show that the lower bound L(x, q) (i.e., the value function of the optimal stopping problem (15)) is well defined for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Then I show that the monopolist's equilibrium profits are equal to L(x, q) for all states (x, q).
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2601046