DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION CREATE ITS OWN POLITICAL SUPPORT?

The Political Economy of Employment Protection

To Create Psychology’s Own Capital

“We do not want to deny our past. We do not suffer from megalomania by thinking that history begins with us. We do not want a brand-new and trivial name from history. We want a name covered by the dust of centuries. We regard this as our historical right, as an indication of our historical role, our claim to realize psychology as a science. We must view ourselves in connection with and in relat...

Does Employment Protection Help Immigrants? Evidence from European Labor Markets

Does Employment Protection Help Immigrants? Evidence from European Labor Markets High levels of employment protection reduce hiring and firing and have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the employment level. Immigrants, being new to the labor market, may be less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights, which may create a gap between the costs for emplo...

Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from Us States*

Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protection ...

Does Employment Protection Reduce the Demand for Unskilled Labor ?

Perhaps it does. We propose a model in which workers with little education or in the tails of the age distribution – the inexperienced and the old – have more chance of job failure (mismatch). Recruits’ average education should then increase and the standard deviation of starting age decrease when strict employment protection raises hiring and firing costs. We test the model using annual distri...