Do audit committees reduce the agency costs of ownership structure?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Do audit committees reduce the agency costs of ownership structure? ¬リニ
We investigate the agency costs of corporate ownership structure and the role of audit committees in mitigating their effect. Using China as a laboratory, where audit committees are voluntary, we study the demand for and value relevance of audit committees conditional on the various agency costs of corporate ownership. Audit committees complement existing internal governance systems by reducing...
متن کاملAgency Costs and Ownership Structure
We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm’s sole shareholder. Utilizing a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database, we find evidence supporting several predictions of agency cost theo...
متن کاملAudit committee activity and agency costs
Menon and Williams indicate that many United States (US) over-the-counter (OTC) ®rms which form audit committees appear not to rely on them (cf. Menon, K., Williams, J.D. 1994. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13(2), 121±139). Reliance on audit committees appears to depend upon board composition, while audit committee activity is associated with ®rm size. In this paper, we compare the U...
متن کاملThe Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
From the viewpoint of a company’s controlling shareholder, the optimal ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid excessive monitoring by other shareholders. The optimal dispersion of share ownership can be achieved by going public, but this choice also entails some costs (the cost of listing and the loss of control over the shareholder register). If the control...
متن کاملTheory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears cos...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0927-538X
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.01.002