Disadvantageous Semicollusion: Price Competition in the Norwegian Airline Industry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Disadvantageous semicollusion: Price competition in the Norwegian airline industry
Motivated by observations in the Norwegian airline industry in the late 90s, we develop a semicollusive model with collusion on gross prices and competition on contracts for large customers (corporate contracts). The theoretical predictions are tested on detailed data on gross prices, large customer prices and quantities in the Norwegian airline industry in the period 1998-2001. We control for ...
متن کاملDisadvantageous semicollusion
Standard analysis in industrial organization indicates that firms earn higher profits if they collude rather than compete on prices (or quantities). However, firms choose other strategic variables, such as investment in capacity or R&D, in addition to choosing prices or production levels. Thus the overall evaluation of product market collusion must take into account its effect on the interactio...
متن کاملDoes Price Matter? Price and Non-Price Competition in the Airline Industry
This paper studies passengers’ choice behavior in air travel. Products are defined as a unique combination of airline and flight itinerary while markets are defined as a directional round-trip air travel between an origin and a destination city. A structural econometric model is used to investigate the relative importance of price (airfare) and non-price product characteristics in explaining pa...
متن کاملPrice of Airline Frequency Competition
Frequency competition influences capacity allocation decisions in airline markets and has important implications to airline profitability and airport congestion. Market share of a competing airline is a function of its frequency share and the relationship between the two is pivotal for understanding the impacts of frequency competition on airline business. Based on the most commonly accepted fo...
متن کاملCollude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry
The purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after the deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities (collusion) or collude on prices and compete on capacities (semicollusion)? We reject the hypothesis that th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2205825