Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Durable–Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand

This paper solves for the profit maximising strategy of a durable–goods monopolist when incoming demand varies over time. Each period, additional consumers enter the market; these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase. We first characterise the consumer’s utility maximisation problem and, under a monotonicity condition, show the profit maximising allocation can be solved throug...

متن کامل

Entry Deterrence in Durable-Goods Monopoly∗

There are industries that tend to remain monopolized, with successive generations of a good being introduced by an incumbent monopolist. This paper investigates the tendency of persistent leadership in durable goods industry. In particular it explores the implications of the durability of a good on the pricing and innovation behavior of both the incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant. It ...

متن کامل

Who Finances Durable Goods and Why it Matters: Captive Finance and the Coase Conjecture∗

We propose that, by financing their own product sales through captive finance subsidiaries, durable goods manufacturers commit to higher resale values for their products in future periods. Using data on captive financing by the manufacturers of heavy equipment, we find that captive backed models have lower price depreciation. The evidence is consistent with captive finance helping manufacturers...

متن کامل

Online Appendix – Durable Goods Monopoly with Stochastic Costs

The proof of Theorem 2 is organized as follows. First, I show that the lower bound L(x, q) (i.e., the value function of the optimal stopping problem (15)) is well defined for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Then I show that the monopolist's equilibrium profits are equal to L(x, q) for all states (x, q).

متن کامل

Entry Deterrence and Innovation in Durable-Goods Monopoly∗

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investment in durable goods monopoly under a threat of entry. It is well known that the durability causes time inconsistency to the durable goods monopolist, which in turn provides a competitive pressure. When entry threat exists, the durability of the product endows the monopolist with the power to deter entry since the current sales alter t...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2018

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2745961