Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share Distributions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share Distributions
I develop a novel method to detect election fraud from irregular patterns in the distribution of vote-shares. I build on awidely discussed observation that in some electionswhere fraud allegations abound, suspiciously manypolling stations return coarse vote-shares (e.g., 0.50, 0.60, 0.75) for the rulingparty,which seemshighly implausible in large electorates. Using analytical results and simula...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Analysis
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1047-1987,1476-4989
DOI: 10.1017/pan.2016.9