Demystifying the myth of sensation: Wilfrid Sellars’ adverbialism reconsidered

Abstract This paper reconstructs and defends a Sellarsian approach to “sensation” that allows us avoid mythological conceptions of it. Part I isolates Sellars’s argument for “sensation,” situating his adverbial interpretation the notion within broader theory perception. II positions views vis-à-vis current conversations on adverbalism. In particular, it focuses Many Property Problem, which is traditionally considered main obstacle adverbialism. After reconstructing response this problem, demonstrate position compatible with some strategies solving can be developed along similar lines. Finally, part III addresses how productively accounts phenomenal properties experience often understood fall under “sensation”. The therefore shows isolating yield non-problematic conception sensation. Indeed, focus offers form direct realism recent forms “new adverbialism”. Although my view remains Sellarsian, defend maintain claims about sensation should resisted as not logically entailed by argument.