Democracy, Redistributive Taxation and the Private Provision of Public Goods

Democracy, redistributive taxation and the private provision of public goods

Article history: Received 16 October 2009 Received in revised form 6 June 2010 Accepted 11 June 2010 Available online 19 June 2010 The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition the private provision of public goods embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on production of public goods, to which Ol...

Public goods provision and redistributive taxation ¬リニ

This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the cont...

Public goods provision, redistributive taxation, and wealth accumulation ¬リニ

Public Provision of Private Goods

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On the Private Provision of Public Goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the ...