Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
Article history: Received 9 October 2011 Available online 3 May 2013 JEL classification: C72 D71 D82
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Acknowledgments A Ph.D. thesis is the product of several years of work and, therefore, influenced by a lot of people. Here I would like to thank all of you who contributed, in one way or another, to me being able to finish this work. The following people deserve a special mention. First of all I thank Marc Uetz for the supervision during this trajectory. Starting with the final project of my ma...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.011