Deadlines and Memory Limitations

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging checkup appointments. Our data show strong systematic effects on patients’ behavior. Imposing induces patients to act earlier persistently higher frequency than without deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond even if these are not tied explicit rewards. Several our findings suggest individuals’ responses shaped limitations in memory attention. illustrate can be powerful management tool encourage timely task completion increase cost effectiveness performance-contingent was accepted Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics decision analysis.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Management Science

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0025-1909', '1526-5501']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4227