منابع مشابه
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Moral hazard is one of the most basic concepts in economics: If someone pays you for your accidents, you will expend less effort trying to avoid them. Insurance companies understand this perfectly well. That's why most insurance contracts include customer deductibles and limited coverage. This seems straightforward enough. Why is it, then, that policymakers appear to have missed this important ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Basic Writing
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0147-1635
DOI: 10.37514/jbw-j.2009.28.2.02