منابع مشابه
Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly, even when there are equilibria in which an agreement is reached, we find that the model always has an e...
متن کاملCostly Signaling and Crisis Bargaining
The sequence of moves are as follows. First nature informs both defender and challenger of their values for the issue in question, vD and vD. vD and vC are drawn from the distribution function FD(v) and FC(v). Second, the defender chooses a signal m ≥ 0, which is observed by the challenger. Third, the challenger chooses whether to challenge; if challenger does not challenge, the game ends. Four...
متن کاملCostly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights...
متن کاملEfficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining∗
Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria, involving disagreements and inefficiencies, in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen [4]) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are transaction/participation costs (Anderlini and Felli [2]). We show that when the players have (at the margi...
متن کاملSequential bargaining and competition^
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, frictionless markets need not be Walra...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3024483