Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Jordan
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economics and Finance
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1916-9728,1916-971X
DOI: 10.5539/ijef.v6n4p210