Corporate debt structure and economic recoveries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.09.013