Contractual incompleteness in an extensive-form game under perfect information using Stackelberg model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Malaysian Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2289-599X,2289-5981
DOI: 10.11113/mjfas.v3n2.29