Consumer Protection in Resale Price Maintenance Practices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Oligopoly price discrimination and resale price maintenance
Oligopoly price discrimination in the retail market prevents a manufacturer from inducing optimal retail margins through any wholesale price. This motivates the manufacturer to impose resale price maintenance. In a model of third-degree price discrimination by rival retailers, a retail price ceiling (or floor) enables the manufacturer to restore the first best. Imposing a fixed retail price is ...
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The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers’ information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus d...
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An upstream manufacturer can use minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors. RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers. If entry is accommodated by retailers, upstream competition leads to fierce downstream competition and the breakdown of RPM. Thus, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent’s profits. ...
متن کاملDoes the Service Argument Justify Resale Price Maintenance?
Proponents of RPM argue that RPM helps to sustain a high level of service at the point of sale and that such a high level is efficient. This paper provides a simple model which leads to the following conclusions: 1) RPM may increase or decrease the level of service. 2) Whether the service level is more efficient under RPM does not depend on the fact that service increases due to RPM. It may be ...
متن کاملSpeculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale
We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder—the speculator—has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator’s expected profit equals zero. Nevertheless, the opportunity for resale can create a role for an active specula...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2364-5369,2364-5369
DOI: 10.18415/ijmmu.v8i1.2195