Consensus Decision-Making and Legislative Inertia at the WTO: Can International Law Help?

The recent emergence of Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) – that is, negotiating initiatives among a subset the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership has reignited debate over lawmaking in WTO. As things stand, WTO operates on basis widespread expectation consensus needs to be achieved for any decision taken. Agreements produce rights and obligations only (‘plurilaterals’, or Annex 4 agreements) are also subject rule thus remain exceptional. Are JSIs first move towards redressing current equilibrium favour agreements ofWTO members and, if so, can they integrated within regime absent amendments? Even though decision-making does not necessarily lead failed negotiations, it is undoubtedly significant contributory factor when parties hold diverse unaligned priorities. Contracts signed involve increasingly heterogeneous players with In this article, we argue first-best approach moving away from legislative stasis at multilateral level acknowledge high time consider how allow an additional degree ‘variable geometry’ trading system. A textual legal approach, however, missing order. An acceptable alternative would adjudicators (WTO panelists Appellate Body members), members, will ultimate gatekeepers deciding whether coexist as part trade framework understood context international law. necessary precondition flourish will, course, resolution judiciary crisis either scenario, what matter end day inter se (that membership) affect enjoyment acquired by non-participants nor frustrate objectives