Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? 1
There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived), from there to a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary), and f...
متن کاملConceivability, Possibility and Two-Dimensional Semantics
Kripke (1980) famously separates the metaphysical and epistemic modal domains, with supposed necessary a posteriori identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, appearing to create an irreconcilable gap between conceivability and possibility. In response to this problem, David Chalmers (2002, 2004a, 2006) uses two-dimensional modal semantics (2DS) to claim that conceivability entails p...
متن کاملThe mind-body problem.
II. The denial of strict psychophysical laws would not undermine the claim that mental events are causally efficacious. § The three premisses from which AM is derived: (1) that mental events are causally related to physical events (2) that singular causal relations are backed by strict laws (3) that there are no strict psycho-physical laws ⇒ AM + P § "supervenience" ___ a predicate p is superve...
متن کاملThe mind-body problem.
JERRY A. FODOR Jerry A. Fodor is professor of philosophy at Rutgers University. He is renowned for defending the view that we think in an inner language, akin to the symbolic codes used in ordinary computers. Fodor's highly influential works include The Language of Thought, The Modularity of Mind, and Psychosemantics. Copyright @ 1981 by Scientific American, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the ...
متن کاملThe Mind–Body Problem
Human beings, and perhaps other creatures, have minds as well as bodies. But what is a mind, and what is its relation to body, or to the physical in general? 1. Mind‐Body Dualism The first answer to the mind‐body question proposed since medieval times was that of Descartes, who held that minds are wholly distinct from bodies and from physical objects of any sort. According to Cartesian dualism,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Philosophical Review
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0031-8108
DOI: 10.2307/2998286