Computing Optimal Mixed Strategies for Terrorist Plot Detection Games with the Consideration of Information Leakage
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computing Optimal Mixed Strategies for Security Games with Dynamic Payoffs
Security agencies in the real world often need to protect targets with time-dependent values, e.g., tourist sites where the number of travelers changes over time. Since the values of different targets often change asynchronously, the defender can relocate security resources among targets dynamically to make the best use of limited resources. We propose a game-theoretic scheme to develop dynamic...
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Ian Frank Complex Games Lab Electrotechnical Laboratory Umezono 1-1-4, Tsukuba Ibaraki, JAPAN 305 [email protected] David Basin Institut f ur Informatik Universitat Freiburg Am Flughafen 17 Freiburg, Germany [email protected] Hitoshi Matsubara Complex Games Lab Electrotechnical Laboratory Umezono 1-1-4, Tsukuba Ibaraki, JAPAN 305 [email protected] Abstract We examine three heuris...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ITM Web of Conferences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2271-2097
DOI: 10.1051/itmconf/20171203001