Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tractable Computational Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria of Perfect-Information Position Auctions
Due to the economic importance of the position auctions used by search engines to sell advertising, these auctions have received considerable recent study. However, most of this study has been analytic, and these analyses have relied on strong assumptions about the structure of the setting. In this paper, we show that it is feasible to perform computational equilibrium analyses of complex, real...
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I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by Shapley–Shubik, Demange–Gale–Sotomayer and Roth– Sotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction can be calculated explicitly and some known results can be sharpened. I provide some empirical evid...
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Modern techniques for representing games and computing their Nash equilibria are approaching the point where they can be used to analyze market games. We demonstrate this by showing how the equilibria of different position auction mechanisms can be tractably identified using these techniques. These results enable detailed and quantitative comparisons of the different auction mechanisms—in terms...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009