Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson (...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.001