Comparing CEO Compensation Effects of Public and Private Acquisitions

CEO Overconfidence Effects on Mergers and Acquisitions

The purpose of the study is to extend further from the result studying overconfidence effects of CEOs on single deal of Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s article to study overconfidence effects of CEOs on multiple mergers and acquisitions. Based on the psychological and financial theories, the likelihood of overconfident CEOs acquiring a company is the net effect of two manifestations of overconfide...

Run-up of Acquirer’s Stock in Public and Private Acquisitions*

Acquisition announcements generate predictable movements in the price of the acquirer’s stock. For example, post-announcement returns are typically negative for high Tobin’s q acquirers, stock transactions, and foreign targets, but positive for private equity-backed private targets. Pre-announcement trading of acquirer’s stock is more likely to be attributable to insider trading when the pre-an...

Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights

CEO Compensation and Company Performance

This paper examines the relationship of CEO pay and company performance for 280 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for a period from 2006 through 2009. The time frame of the study is a period after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and after the SEC approval of the corporate governance rules affecting executive pay for New York Stock Exchange companies. I find there to be a positi...

CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance∗

This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other type of compensation. The model explains why good countrywide investor protection breeds good firm gover...