Commentary: M-Autonomy

. M-autonomy

What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an uninte...

m CLINICAL CONCEPTS AND COMMENTARY

THE Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson was one of the earliest known victims of a respiratory complication after surgery, dying of pneumonia 10 days after an otherwise successful ether anesthetic in 1863. Despite subsequent advances in anesthesia and surgical care, postoperative pulmonary complications (PPCs) still are a significant problem in modern practice. This commentary examines why ...

AHRQ WebM&M: Case & Commentary Print View

A previously healthy 44-year-old man was admitted to the hospital with a 2-day history of headache and word-finding difficulties. Neurological examination was normal but computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the head revealed parietal and frontal masses concerning for malignancy or infection. Biopsy revealed evidence of vasculitis. Consultation with infectious disease...

Commentary on Andrea Westlund’s ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy’ and Catriona Mackenzie and Jacqui Poltera’s ‘Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves and Autonomy.’

Andrea Westlund’s ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy’ and Catriona Mackenzie and Jacqui Poltera’s ‘Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves and Autonomy’ have many overlapping themes. In what follows, I draw out one of the overlapping themes: both articles distinguish between the necessary conditions for ‘identity’ or cross-temporal agency and the necessary conditions for autonomy. I suggest that ...

Reply to Commentary on Our Paper “Palliative Care and Patient Autonomy.”