Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities

This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the super-additive, and grand coalition effectively increases global payoff. also model balanced thus, it has nonempty core. means there always exists at least one mechanism makes stable. Therefore, prosumers will achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample presented demonstrate not convex based on Shapley values does necessarily ensure stability of coalition. To find stabilizing belongs core game, worst-case excess minimization concept applied. In this concept, however, size optimization problem exponentially with respect number members EC. make computationally tractable, idea clustering their generation/load profiles considering same profile share cluster proposed here. K-means algorithm used prosumers' profiles. way, would have several redundant constraints can be removed. The are identified removed via generalized Llewellyn's rules. Finally, an apartment building southern part Finland metropolitan area studied effectiveness method.