Coalition-Proof Equilibrium

Strategy-proof coalition formation

We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents’ preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they are members of. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents’ preferences a partition of the society. We are interested in rules that never provide incentives for the agents to misrepresent their pre...

Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation

model of social choice, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that – provided there are more than two alternatives at stake– every strategy-proof social choice rule is dictatorial. However, reasonable strategy-proof rules exist if appropriate restrictions are imposed on agents’ preferences. In coalition formation problems, such domain For further references, see the recent works by Baner...

Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly

Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proof Mechanisms

Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market objective is supermodular. Nevertheless, several auctions do not satisfy the stringent conditions for supermodularity. These auctions include electricity markets...

Dynamic Coalition Formation and Equilibrium Policy Selection*

A model of policy formulation is proposed in which the government and the private sector form dynamic coalitions for the purpose of choosing policy actions. However, current players cannot commit their future selves to any particular actions. Defining an equilibrium to be an unblocked sequence of actions, we show that an equilibrium exists and is unique even though, in general, cooperative outc...